Category: definition

introduction to my rationales for a new #neurodiverse-#it in order to solve #complexproblems:

my real concerns around being #secrecypositive, or not at all, have lately had nothing to do with governments and what they do with our right to #secrecy. after all, many citizens buy #secrecypositive reading- and sharing-machines of highly controversial content quite legally in all #european countries: we call them books, and they are made of paper. nothing more #secrecypositive than this millennium-old way of sharing and spreading, both in good and bad faith, information of all kinds.

so if it’s legal on paper, with pencil or ink, and has been for centuries, why not repeat in digital — and sooner than later?

you see, the problem isn’t discovering a digital burglary has taken place. because the removal of a digital privacy or object or piece of content like this is possible to achieve by copying exactly. the removal is consequently effected without removing. but its potentially prejudicial removal is a fact all the same. just as if in a life more conventionally real:

• www.secrecy.plus/spt-it

my problem is never a government access to my bedroom, and always instead a criminal usage of similar accesses:

no.

i don’t mind — really don’t mind — knowing good governments can see what i do. i wouldn’t mind, for example, the #swedish government watching me in this way, because they are a state which strives to legitimate itself always.

meantime, i have minded the british doing the same to me since they incarcerated me improperly back in 2003, using #mentalhealth legislation to achieve #nationalsecurity objectives: there really is no way the homeland of boris johnson, even now as it currently stands twenty long years later, can be called a legitimate world player of any standing whatsoever.

and certainly not for the rest of #europe. because in order to erect and democratically sustain a hierarchy of surveillance, you have to robustly aspire in an ongoing way to manifesting that same democracy of legitimation.

to challenges, then, which i’d like to answer with the project “complexify.me”:

but even governments and governances as immensely competent as the #swedish ones manifestly show themselves to be can’t respond wholly cogently to the following set of quandaries i and many others find ourselves both intellectually and emotionally suffering from right now:

• yes, the governments of good nation-states like #sweden must act deeply to preserve the delicate balance of their societies which evidence this goodness: and more intelligently as a result of their delicacy.
• for they, more than say the british (and not just now but, in hindsight, for much longer than we pretended was ever the case), are entirely vulnerable — out of choice … and rightly so! — to such ecosystems of goodwill being upturned by outsiders and insiders who prefer to take advantage of these profoundly democratic freedoms for their own criminal gain. for in the freedoms of such constituted trusts lie the essences of their wisdoms.
• the quid pro quo, or the caveat if you like, is this: we must as essentially democratic peoples accept that sometimes in order to protect our treasured states there will exist a need to do less democratic acts. but for a limited period of time clear to all, and even then to proportionate measure.
• because being this kind of democracy doesn’t mean you cannot maintain yourself with insight and firmness. you don’t have to limit yourself to rolling over and thinking of the northern lights because you are good and mustn’t defend yourself with decision on occasions. and so to deliver on this, you do need to have the ongoing capacity to gather any information and datasets that preserve these laudable states of fragile coexistence, without at the same time puncturing them.

summarising my thoughts on these matters a little:

understand me: i’m not saying don’t watch your citizens. i’m saying as citizens we have to watch each other, all of us to all of us: but as KEEPERS of each other’s human souls, so that necessary violent actions of the state are always, always, kept to a bare minimum.

finally, digital burglary — as described above — inconveniently can happen without us ever being aware of it: and in this “us”, i mean the state, its best professionals and its most intelligent citizens … all of us.

my issue, therefore, with deep surveillance is that if my government does it, even where immensely cleverly, in it will exist people with two dangerously connected roles:

a) rights of legal and proper access to state surveillance tools, datasets and infrastructures; and

b) illegitimate obligations, for whatever reasons, as humans possessed of covert and completely illegal relationships with an ever more embedded, organised, and creative criminality.

conclusions to the above:

if my state says it needs to surveill me to the extent that it can even see and hear me whilst i have sex, in order that it may protect me in more relevant matters, it will already exist as a capability of the aforementioned criminality years before. and so, as mil’s theorem suggests:

• the consequences being …? we can’t fight this kind of crime only with good #neurotypical people who are naturally comfortable with such #neurotypical-#it platforms and tools.
• we must include equally good people with #neurodiverse abilities and brand new kinds of #neurodiverse-#it, so they can then start to construct and tell the stories that describe the #darkfigure increasingly being committed out there in some of the ways i now describe.
• stories which the existent #neurotypical professionals — properly and usefully so, too — can then begin to chase down and stop in whatever sanctioned ways the states of good faith in our #europeanunion judge to be necessary, at each historical moment in our collective future-presents.

• complexify.me | www.sverige2.earth/complexify