why i am not fit for working in crime and security … but why #complexproblems is a quite different matter

crime is a domain i have pretty good knowledge of at #autoethnographic and #academic levels, but it is always going to be a subset of #complexproblems: #complexproblems are NOT a subset of a generally creative #criminality.

mil williams, stockholm sweden, 14th april 2023

i just want this to be clear. i’m happy for others to work with my ideas in security and so forth. but i am going to focus on developing systems for #neurodiverse #thinkingspaces that begin to solve #complexproblems our species needs resolving, above and beyond #criminality.


things like #climatechange and #foodsecurity for example.

crime is a domain i have pretty good knowledge of at #autoethnographic and #academic levels, but it is always going to be a subset of #complexproblems: #complexproblems are NOT a subset of a generally creative #criminality.

what’s more, i don’t have the confidence of people in #lawenforcement and #security. never have: never will. i’m a free-thinker, above all. this doesn’t make me better, at all. but it might mean it makes me incompatible with good #security and #lawenforcement praxis.

so this is what i am now thinking and strategising. i may be able to acquire the necessary confidence to do these things in other fields of human endeavour. at the very least, the potential for a decent engagement is more likely in other areas now.

if there are people in some allied country who work, even so, in crime and related, and still are interested in what i propose, do come forwards and show yourselves.

but even here, let’s propose that anything we do starts with the principle and framework of #complexproblems, not creative #criminality.

contact me on the email below, if you do want to explore.

just explore.

just see the reality. examine the truth. and maybe, just maybe, do something usefully different for a change:

milwilliams.sweden@outlook.com

complexify.me | #neurodiverse software and hardware architecture for solutioning #complexproblems

(because i’m really really really NOT as fierce as you have been led to believe by the people back home …)


“coffee-shop cctv hacked to gain intel with military value”: EXACTLY why our security needs different tech philosophies

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/11/russian-hackers-target-security-cameras-inside-ukraine-coffee-shops

and these freedoms for us all. not just the inhibiting hierarchies enjoyed by those who own — in more ways than one — this thing we know as tech. and therefore our democracies.

mil williams, stockholm sweden, 12th april 2023

there is so much #darkfigure being delivered by people in tech, and our law-enforcement and security agencies have given up on developing systems which could counter such #neocrime:

crimehunch.com/neocrime

the agencies rely heavily on machines plus humans — in that order — because their tech partners are interested in the monetisation virtues of this order of priorities:

sverige2.earth/complexify


meantime, the bad hackers use humans plus machines — in this order — to creatively imagine, imagineer, and only then engineer new and covert ways of committing crimes that remain as invisible as possible for as long as possible.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/11/russian-hackers-target-security-cameras-inside-ukraine-coffee-shops


and it’s not even that our agencies are criminal in the main (though some take advantage of #darkfigure extensively to bend, or sometimes go so far as to break, the law), but their ongoing inability to recognise the importance of humans over machines is negligence of a sort:


and even more so, the illegitimate criminal power of the human+machine workflows and deals over the agency machine+human combos is utterly ignored, in the absence of truthful criteria re innovation and procurement. and yet it would be so easy to begin a process of repurposing, with integrity, of existing technologies to ensure people are made bigger by machines and not diminished.

i’m sorry. but it has to be observed, painful though the recognition, if a given, will be.

because this next one has to be taken on the chin, if we are to improve our capacity to fight creative criminality in a collective future-present:

9/11 came about because horribly creative humans used machines as tools to kill other humans, who failed to prevent it from happening because their tech partners had consistently recommended using machine+human workflows.

not because they really believed this was true; that is, that human intuition was a lesser value than the incremental thinking engendered by machines.

no.

rather, because machines+humans make more money, more easily, than workflows that consist of humans+machines … that is, humans expanded and enhanced by machines.

mil williams, stockholm sweden, 12th april 2023

crimehunch.com/terror

and so the only way we can prevent such horrors in the future — particularly the invisible ones such as the recent us defense leaks due to bad hackers and web actors, some of which date back to october 2022 and are only just now discovered, as well as the cctv hacking reported in the guardian newspaper article above — is to begin to reverse the order and purpose of tech.

this — what follows now — is what i suggest and advocate most firmly: humans always first, enhanced and expanded by tools whose primary rationale no longer remains monetising a tech partner into obscene levels of technological wealth whatever the wider human cost but, instead, delivering without exception on making a safer and more secure, more legitimate, more socially responsible, and more honest world all round.

and these freedoms for us all. not just the inhibiting hierarchies enjoyed by those who own — in more ways than one — this thing we know as tech. and therefore our democracies:

sverige2.earth/complexify


complex problems vs security and law-enforcement: how to square the circle of my ideas

let’s say i have to do something to be allowed to live:

i have a no-no or two, though …

not meeting family: not anyone. maybe one exception … but not a demand i make again; not even implied. not even wishing for. i won’t presume.

re family, i’m happy with my mother and the one sibling i get on with, but no one else on any other side. there’s always my children and so forth, but that’s never been your business. that will begin to work again in the future if it does; and if it doesn’t, i will share responsibility for any eventual failure.

‘problem is, you lost me this morning when you didn’t follow up — here no going back, because you were playing with me cruelly: no irish, no croatian, no other english — forget it.

talking realistically, in order to square two circles:

let’s talk realistically — what can i do to have a life more or less reasonably without your surveillance and neo-terrorism, everywhere i turn?

remember: i will, after what you failed to deliver on this morning, never meet with family nor anyone with a relationship to, whether personal or business, whom i don’t already get on with. you lost that opportunity today, just to underline.

but other things within my capacity … well, these things, for sure … more than happy to, actually really eager to.

you want to undermine the capacity of the tech i want to see in security? this can be resolved easily. you have your reasons i know: i can see why of course, though i will never share the criteria because i am far more a purist in these matters than you ever will be. but for us to proceed — for you to proceed — there is a solution which i now put before you all.

one caveat: one condition. as long as i get enough to have a comfortable rest of my life, we can talk about this but it requires you first to evidence that “neo-terrorism on the individual” will not be committed against my person again. and that is not an easy call to evidence.

some minimums, first:

  • i want european residence from this month.
  • i want an official, even if only cover, role that suits my skillset, in my judgement.
  • i don’t care if it’s employment or self-, but if either or both, i must be very difficult to fire. i want the kind of job security i’ve never had in my life, mainly because of british interventions to date.
  • i commit to targets everyone must commit to, but no opportunity for “noi” again, for this reason. (whether uk/irish influences — or within sweden itself, the latter of which has also already manifested itself.)
  • the legal side: i want a position of institutional power to deliver on “noi” as a robust legal figure, in the three years i scope; and thus the seven years i have as my goal to regular and widespread prosecutions.
  • i want to be in charge of complex problem-solutioning programmes, but completely outwith security.
  • i want to be able to exclusively license to all fields relating to security, the strategising and development of which i shall play zero part in the future.
  • loopholes, however, will remain part of my side of the deal: a complex problem to be eliminated eventually in the 20-year timeframe i propose. “noi”, too, as previously mentioned.
  • no conditions can be placed around the tech my side chooses to repurpose or begin to develop further. any developed tech will be developed exclusively for complex problem-solutioning, and then any reuse for security will involve new licensing agreements.
  • c is fine if she wants. it’d be cool and fair if she did, but that’s her choice. she chooses.
  • no other family contact, not after today.
  • no people or companies from my past in what i am responsible for: they may, if it is judged appropriate, however, freely participate to any level at all in respect of security workstreams i have nothing to do with in the future.

distribution of existing workstreams:

  • websites:
    • i license ideas from crime hunch, citizen hunch, and omiwan to security.
    • platform genesis is complex problems, not security.
    • the philosopher space is complex problems, not security.
    • secrecy.plus where applied to complex problems belongs to this stream. where security, it belongs to security from the start.
      • we negotiate the details of the division and separation, as expected would be the case.
      • examples: fire is clearly to be licensed to security, and will not be my responsibility in the future.
      • digital pencil & paper is my workstream.
    • i want hmagi for complex absolutely, but maybe it can be a common workstream. i doubt you will eventually want it; but i’m up for a common workspace for it, myself.
    • never meet again: that i keep entirely for my workstreams. nothing to do with security.
  • complex problems: where do they sit and who do they work with?
    • my initial thoughts: swedish interests, agencies and unis; the eu, particularly the ec; the un; and so forth.
  • security: that’s up to you. not my job. but i’d suggest:
    • the italians first, who are historically firm in the integrity of their pursuit of organised criminality.
    • in the uk, the met’s internal affairs department might be another good place to start.

locations:

  1. complex problems obviously then to be located in sweden and europe.
  2. this means it’s very easy for security to definitively locate to the us.

wdyt?

is this now possible?